Published 18.06.2026
In November 2025, negotiators, political leaders, and civil society groups from around the world convened in Belém, Brazil for the 30th conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), or COP 30. Thanks to funding from the BIEA and my home institution, the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), I was to attend as an academic observer to track the interventions of Kenyan negotiators during the summit.
Unfortunately, I was one of many COP 30 participants whose travel plans were disrupted and I was unable to get to COP. Instead, to fill in the gaps between news reports, I travelled to Nairobi in February 2026 to interview government and civil society attendees. These interviews form the final piece of fieldwork for my doctoral dissertation, which is based on a case study of climate politics and diplomacy in Kenya. What follows is a summary of the main findings of these interviews and a preview of the next stage of Africa’s climate diplomacy.
Even for participants who made it to Brazil, apprehensions about logistics proved correct. Several Kenyan participants said it was one of the most chaotic UN summits they had attended, with challenges ranging from transportation and accommodation to a flood and fire at the venue. These challenges hampered the progress of negotiations, particularly in the first week of the summit.
Security issues were a particular challenge for civil society. After protestors breached UN security and halted negotiations, the police and military presence at the venue intensified, limiting further engagement. “This is the first time I’ve been to a COP and never went for a civil society demonstration. The civic space was so limited,” said one Kenyan civil society participant.
One important difference from COP 29, for the purposes of my research, was that Tanzania took over from Kenya as head of the African Group of Negotiators, the technical body which coordinates the shared negotiating position of all African Union members; in March 2025, Tanzania’s Climate Envoy Dr. Richard Muyungi took on the position.
According to one long-time negotiator for the Kenyan government, the AGN presence at COP30 was less robust than usual due to the travel challenges. “The teams were quite weak. Many lead negotiators were unable to attend. African countries had smaller delegations, so we were spread so thinly, covering multiple negotiation streams as well as having to brief our own minister.”
Another negotiator said the violence surrounding the 29 October 2025 general elections in Tanzania – which continues to draw international criticism – damaged the credibility of the AGN Chair. “That cloud featured in how Africa was organized to negotiate,” she said.
“Tanzania was impacted by the elections and the global perception that they had. So that forced the other countries within Africa to really step up and stand up for Africa.”
A significant split within the Africa Group occurred over the EU-led effort to include a firm commitment to “transition away from fossil fuels” in the final COP decision. The Arab Group and Russia firmly opposed this idea. While the AGN did not take an official position, AGN Chair Muyungi reportedly aligned with the Arab Group in closed negotiations. Citing the continent’s energy needs, he urged African ministers to oppose any commitment to transition away from fossil fuels. In a public break from the AGN, Kenya and Sierra Leone joined the group of 80 countries supporting the clean energy transition. In the end, the EU initiative failed. Instead, Parties agreed to begin work on a roadmap for a voluntary phase-out of fossil fuels.
The top two priorities of the Africa Group going into COP30 were adaptation and climate finance. Power Shift Africa called COP30 “a political crossroads” for adaptation, with two major items on the agenda: the indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and affirming a 2021 commitment to double adaptation finance. In a 15 November briefing, the AGN listed the Adaptation Fund as the top priority for political intervention by African ministers.
Success on these issues was mixed. The COP30 decision included the launch of 59 indicators for the GGA, a two-year technical process to operationalise the indicators, and a commitment to triple adaptation finance by 2035. The Pan-African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) called these “important but incomplete wins.”
Some Kenyan negotiators complained that the agreed-upon Belém Adaptation Indicators were politically driven. As one climate think tank reported, the indicators “were derived from a politically sensitive and time-constrained process that generated concerns among some Parties regarding their scientific robustness and usability.”
There was some progress on adaptation finance, with Parties pledging an additional $135 million for adaptation, and several UNFCCC funds directed to increase support for National Adaptation Plans. However, PACJA said the final outcome “leaves the finance gap wide open.” For example, parties failed to agree on the change to the Adaptation Fund which the AGN had prioritised. Progress on other finance items, such as the new Loss and Damage Fund, was similarly mixed.
Preparations are well underway for COP32 in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia will be the first Least Developed Country (LDC) to host the summit, and the first sub-Saharan African country since COP 17 in Durban, South Africa in 2011. As COP President, Ethiopia will have significant symbolic and technical influence, including the ability to shape the agenda and negotiate between factions on the final agreement.
Ghana is also set to have more influence for the next two years, as the West African country now leads the AGN. Dr. Nana Antwi-Boasiako Amoah, a long-time negotiator from Ghana’s Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), took over the role in January. At an April planning meeting, he said Africa’s climate diplomacy must be “aligned with our energy needs, industrial ambitions and development realities.”
For many African countries – including Ghana, an oil producer, and Tanzania, which has major natural gas reserves – these ambitions include the development of fossil fuels. It remains to be seen whether countries like Kenya, which gets over 90 percent of its power from renewable energy, will continue to align with the Africa Group in climate negotiations or forge their own path in the global debate.
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